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There is a very efficient device for
bruising the intimate feelings of a scient
ist. If one were to advise him that science
is a valueless pursuit, and that his labor-
ratory techniques are good for nothing,
the scientist would be quickly propelled
out of that state of depersonalized object
ivity which he so prizes in experimentation.
The reason for so spirited a reaction
is plain enough. About the value of science
the scientist has no doubt at all, however
indifferent he may be to the broader ques
tion of objective values. He will not yield
to the notion that the scientific endeavor
is without worth. In an atomic age the
one valuable thing, he may even think, is
the pursuit of scientific inquiry; whether
there are eternal and unchangeable moral
norms or values may be a matter for
cloistered dispute, but the value of science
is indisputable.
And yet it was precisly modern science
which at the beginning of our generation
insisted in uncompromised terms that it
has no dealings with an eternal, unchang
ing moral and spiritual order. Almost all
standard scientific works were marked,
as a characteristic feature, by the absence
of reference to values or ends for the sake
of which reality exists or ought to exist.
They assumed either that no such realm
of purpose and value exists, or that,
if
it does, the scientist knows nothing about
it. One could gaze through a microscope
into Herbert Spencei's tightly-printed
books, but he would search in vain for
interactions with the sphere of the good
and of the holy. The adaptations, cohesions
and integrations which interested Spencer
were not of a moral and spiritual kind.
Julian Huxley exlpressed the dominant
mood pithily when he wrote that science
is "morally and emotionally neutral" (in
Science and Religion, p 18).
But no scientist has a right to assume
the value of science unless he becomes
explicit about the science of values. Huxley
merely begged the question when he re
marked that "the only value which it
(science) recognizes is that of truth and
knowledge" (ibid., p. 18) For during mil
itary combat the science of censorship
has demonstrated that truth may often
be less valuable than falsehood, and the
value of knowledge can hardly be de
monstrated within the limited scope of
empirical tentativity, with its constant de
mand for revising all conclusions. The
value of science depends upon the science
of values. If there is no objective good then
science is not objectively good for any
thing. If there are no abiding values, then
science has no abiding value. If good and
evil are artificial or tentative distinctions,
then whenever men declare that science is
"good for" something they may equally
well assert it to be "bad for" the same
thing. Science is a valueless and worthless
endeavor if it operates in a sphere in
which value and worth are without a
home. We must either admit values, and
talk of science, or debar values, and cease
to assume the value of science.
The scientist has an immediate retort
to this kind of argument. Science can
have value and can be good for much,
he contends, without any necessary com
mitment to an eternal and abiding moral
and spiritual realm. The real value of
science, he says, is that it helps us to
make an effective adjustment.
It should be noted that the scientist
has no right at this point to any qualify
ing adjective suggestive of ethical dis
tinctions ; he must not, that is, speak of
a better or higher or proper adjustment,
because these all imply a scale of values.
But then, why is it good that we be aided
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in making an effective adjustment? If the
evolutionary process really moves on
from simple to increasingly complex forms,
why may it not involve the production of
a supra-human species, destined to sur
pass man as man has surpassed the amoe
ba? What is the good of an adjustment in
the interest of longevity? Or, what do we
want to live longer for? Or, if the most
effective adjustment in the interest of
Soviet perpetuity should involve our sud
den demolition, does not such an applic
ation of science fulfill the value of facil
itating human adjustment?
Sometimes it is assumed that, rather
than eternal and changeless values, all
that is necessary for an ethical civiliz
ation is a continuity of meaning for a
generation at a time. The false optimism
which underlies this sort of thought is
easily unmasked. When does the gener
ation begin and where does it end? Us
ually it is assumed by such theorists that
the generation of which they speak be
gins with their birthdate and ends with
their demise�a convenient personal mode
of dating to the neat chronology of which
the prevailing ideologies do not readily
accommodate themselves. It remains that
if what is good today may become evil to
morrow the door is ajar to the ethical
relativism which openly declares that might
is right. No ideology which makes value
to mean simply what is most pleasant
or most powerful, i. e., effective, can pro
test against naturalistic power politics.
The problem of values has been pro
pelled into the laboratories of modern
scientists by the international events of
our times. It is crystal clear now that
science can be combined with a natur
alistic as well as an idealistic or a theistic
outlook on life, and that atomic energy can
be employed to make men slaves or to
make them free. On the one hand, we are
told by supernaturalists that national fit
ness to survive is in terms of values in
tegral to Christian culture, in contrast
with the older civilizations of China, India
and the Middle East, or of the new
civilization of the Soviet. P. A. Sorokin
warns us that ethical relativism has reach
ed its maximum in our times, and that the
reduction of value to individual fancy is
a sign of "mental and moral anarchy"
which, if not halted, can lead only to "com
plete disintegration or mummification." On
the other hand, naturalists like Harry
Elmer Barnes condemn supernaturalistic
ethics, equating its chief interest with a
puritanical sex life and an auspicious
entry into the hereafter. The moral code
necessary for survival, Barnes contends,
must be founded not upon religion and
revelation, but upon the natural and social
sciences.
Here, clearly, are two vastly different
views. In the one case, values are assumed
to be eternal and unchanging; the good
is not something made in Japan, nor Rus
sia, nor even in the United States. In the
other case, it is assumed that no super
natural realm exists, but that values are
simply ideals, subject to revision, project
ed by man in his continuing effort to
master his environment.
Modern science has vacillated between
these alternatives. Nineteenth and twen
tieth century science exhibit a most re
markable contrast in their respective at
titudes toward the objectity of values.
Nineteenth century physics, except in
its higher agnostic moments, was com
mitted to a view of the universe which
assigned to moral, aesthetic and religious
values only a subjective status, to a view
which denied an objectively real moral
and religious consciousness as illusory.
The reason advanced by nineteenth cen
tury physics for this attitude is well known
even to vast mulitudes not skilled in the
subtleties of philosophy. To be real, as
serted the physics of two generations ago.
an object had to be visible and tangible ; all
else belonged to the realm of phantasy and
goblin, or was at best a matter of faith
without a knowledge basis. The content of
knowledge was limited to the data of sen
sation. The only reality known to science,
we were told, is phenomenal, and is subject
to mechanical causation which tolerates no
exceptions ; all else- -God, moral norms, the
inner sense of moral or religious obligation
- - belongs to the mythological or postu-
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lational, as the spiritual was rebaptised by
contemporary naturalism. Physics was
wedded to the naturaHstic bias with all the
authority that many influential scientists
could muster. The impression was carried
in academic centers that one had to take his
choice either be scientifiic or religious,
but not both�until the cleavage between
religion and science had been made all but
absolute.
The case for that sort of a imiverse, in
which any God, or any soul, or any moral
norm, had to have a subjective reality, was
never proved by nineteenth century physics,
else more recent thought would not have
found it so repugnant. The science of the
end of the century had not demonstrated
that the spiritual is unreal, any more than
it proved that reality must be seeable and
touchable; it had no method for dealing
with any reahties other than the natural,
and consequently was incompetent to de
liver a judgment with regard to them. The
physics of the day assumed - under the
sway of phenomenalism - that reality
must be sensate, and in consequence of this
assumption, it denied the reality of the
spiritual and moral.
Revolutionary changes in thought have
carried contemporary science a long dis
tance from that mechanical, block-t)rpe
universe of the nineteenth century. Today
physicists on every hand insist that the
most real things are invisible. The space-
time universe has undergone transsub-
stantiation. The real world is not, we are
told, the familiar world of persons and
places, neither the chairs on which we sit,
nor the floor on which we stand, nor the
things we see and touch. Rather, the real
world is invisible, a world of atoms and
electrons eluding the human eye, and not
subject to that strict mechanical causal
uniformity upon which the physics of the
past generation insisted. The nature of the
real world is not visible and touchable ; the
visible and touchable are not as ultimately
real as the invisible and untouchable. The
real world is permeated not with strict
causal continuity, but - as far as we know
it, at least - with a liberal discontinuity.
Since there is an objectively real world
which is invisible, twentieth century physics
does not arbitrarily rule out the possibility
of an ultimate moral and spiritual order;
neither God, nor values, nor the dictates of
the religious and ethical consciousness need
be explained away as illusory. So we hear
much of the new tolerance of science for
religion and morahty.
In fact, philosophical physicists like Sir
Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans
assert that the universe known to twentieth
century physics finds its best explanation
in the view that reality is the thought of a
divine Mind. They emphasize that the
scientific method does not reach far enough
to rule upon this issue; no thinker can say,
as a scientist, that there is no objective
moral and spiritual order, for his methodo
logy is too limited to make a pronotmce-
ment in this realm. Since the scientific
method carries us not to reality, but only
to that point from which the ultimate, in
visible reality is inferred, these scientists
hold that the correct inference is to an ob
jective Mind, rather than to mere non-
mental events, or to the mechanical block
universe of a half -century ago. The in
visible real world, they contend, is not
merely a scheme of symbols connected by
mathematical formulae, but rather, is a
mathematical Thinker.
It would be short-sighted indeed to re
gard men like Eddington and Jeans as
essentially in the Christian tradition be
cause of their proclamations here. For,
since the scientific method does not reach
to ultimate reality, these scholars do not
speak as scientists when they declare for
an ultimate Mind, any more than other
scientists speak as scientists when they de
clare against theism in favor of naturalism.
The very point of departure is the con
fession of the inability of the scientific
method to pronounce on the issue of theism
and of objective morality. Just because a
scientist turns metaphysician, there is no
reason for assigning to his works a vene
ration greater than that due the works of a
metaphysic alert to scientific discoveries.
Scientists have sometimes declared for an
objective spiritual and moral order in a
profoundly non-Christian sense, and that
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in the very name of Christianity. The new
emphasis that matter and spirit may not be
as foreign to each other as once thought,
should not obscure the Christian conviction
that the being of the universe is not the
being of God, any more than the inde
terminacy of the atom should obscure the
Biblical doctrine of the particular provi
dence of God. That a man is a specialist in
science does not give him any special
qualification for pronouncing on the nature
of ultimate reality. He displays the true
scientific spirit when he emphasizes that
his methodology cannot possibly settle the
issue one way or the other, not when, in the
name of science, he comes out for or
against an objective moral or spiritual or
der. The issue is not determined by the
scientific method, and the consequences
must be applied in both directions. The
declarations of Eddington and Jeans in
the interest of an idealistic interpretation of
the universe, insisting that the proper in
ference from the data of science is to a
creative Mind and not simply to an ob
jective mathematical order, are not to be
worshipped because they come from
physicists, for they are among the first to
remind us that physics is impotent to
determine the question. The merit of their
insistence upon a supreme creative Mind
and upon the objectivity of values turns on
other factors, and on these factors
scientists have no monopoly. Indeed, if
anything, science in recent generations has
disclosed a poverty of interest in the crucial
and relevant facts which are determinative
in this regard.
Within the restrictions of modem
science, the scientist cannot say that there
is an objective moral and spiritual order;
he can say only that he cannot declare that
these are merely subjective. That is not to
say that the scientist needs to be, nor that
he should be, agnostic about spiritual
verities. The testimony of scientists to the
objectivity of values is not important be
cause they are scientists, but because they
combine intelligent thought about the
super-scientific world with intelligent
thought about the scientific. When a scien
tist declares for an objectively real super
natural order, he provides evidence that a
scientist who scores one hundred in physics
need not on that account score zero in
metaphysics.
Curiously, while indoctrinating the
academic world in the unrivaled effective
ness of scientific methodology to deliver us
from mythology and superstition, much of
the science of yesterday placed itself at the
service-erroneously, as admitted today-of
a most specious sort of mythology. By
converting its methodology into a meta
physics, it ended up with a block universe
without any possibility of an objective
moral and spiritual order. That was a
ficitious world, even if proffered in the
name of science. A methodology which re
quires the a priori dismissal of God as
only a projection of fancy, and of all
ethical codes as the mere voice of tradition,
discloses more about its own limitations,
than it does about the nature of religion
and morality.
Contemporary thought is coming now
to see that because Bertrand Russell is a
genius in the realm of mathematics, he has
no right to reduce sex to sheer mathe
matical rhythm, that because Robert
Millikan is an illustrious physicist, his view
of human nature need not be considered
profoimd when he declares that war has
survived simply because it has survival
value; that because Albert Einstein is a
briUiant physicist, he is not on that accoimt
an authority when he declares that ethical
behavior requires no support from religion.
The great turning point in modem
scientific attitudes is the recognition that
the scientific method does not afford us
the exclusive access to tmth. The great
ages of philosophy entertained hardly a
doubt about the serious limitations of a
sensory methodology. The classic Greek
outlook, the medieval world view, and the
rationalistic philosophers from Descartes
to Hegel were agreed that, were know
ledge a product of sensation alone, the
whole quest for truth must be abandoned.
Even the early modern empirical philos
ophers, Locke and Berkeley, believed in
much more than they saw. But nineteenth
century physics held that the scientific
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method provided the sole avenue to truth,
and by so doing reduced reality in intent
to the world of nature. The upheaval due
to the newer physics is so remarkable, in
contrast with the naturalism of two gene
rations ago, that C. E. M. Joad does not
hesitate to declare that "so far an English
and American scientists are concerned, the
leaders seem almost unanimously to disown
any exclusive claim on the part of science
to give us information about the nature of
reality"
*
If the scientific method then gives us
but an abstracted view of reality, so that
by necessity it does not deal with such
realities as God and the moral order, the
question arises, why a paper on "Modern
Science and Values"? The reply is simple.
This is a gathering, in the main, of scien
tists, and it is one thing to hold that the
scientific method has proper limitations,
and another thing to say that a scientist is
a man who limits himself so as to have
nothing to do with deity and morality.
*
Precisely at this juncture the science of
yesterday contributed disastrously to the
moral paralysis of our times. It was not
from the scientist of that day that we got
much hint of the reality of the super
natural ; it was not from the scientist that
we got much encouragement for the belief
in the objectivity of values; it was not by
the scientist that we were taught that man
is essentially more than an animal. Whether
the scientist's silence was due to unbelief,
or due to the inabihty of his restricted
methodology to deal with these issues, did
not affect the general outcome, which was
the impression that a man who specializes
in scientific things has to be indifferent to
religion and morality. The scientific mood
seemed to be that, simply because he con
centrates within an abstracted method, the
scientist has to cut himself off in his
thought and life and pronouncement from
'Philosophical Asp\ects of Modern Science
p. 189.
'This paper was delivered at the fourth an
nual convention of the American Scientific Af
filiation in Los Angeles, California, August 25,
1949.
anything outside that method and by so
doing, the scientist of recent generations
nourished the false dogma that the scien
tific method is the avenue to truth, and
that the world of nature is the ultimate
real. The undisputed fact that major dis
coveries are made by the scientific method
came to mean, in such an atmosphere, that
nothing significant is to be learned by di
vine revelation. That the scientific method
was agnostic about values came to imply
that the scientist must be, at most, agnostic
about them.
Because of this failure to insist upon the
objective reality of a spiritual and moral
order, the average scientist has become
one of the most curious figures of the mid-
twentieth century. Indicating by his per
sonal example that a truly scientific atti-
ttide involves silence about spiritual and
moral realities, the scientist, confronted in
an atom bomb age by world peril due to the
"might is right" relativism of the Soviet,
suddenly pleads for an alertness to the
moral implications of scientific discoveries.
Yet, in company with other influences, it
was scientism that discouraged alertness
to an objective morality; it was scientism
which encouraged indifference to religion
and ethics, by a preoccupation with the
world of nature, to which man was absorb
ed. This engrossment with nature helped
to substitute a false means of salvation
for the salvation which the prophets and
apostles and Jesus Christ proclaimed. The
deepest reason for the modern man's hope
became evolution, or scientific method
ology, or some other alternative to Biblical
redemption. In contrast to the Scriptural
ideal of man's dominion over nature, im
possible of proper actualization apart from
the redemptive work of God, modern
science held forth the ideal of a conquest
of nature without any reference to man's
rnoral and spiritual regeneration. Thus it
obscured ends in the quest for means.
There was no intention of glorifying God
in the pagan subduction of nature. Where
the New Testament has asserted that "we
see not yet all things in subjection to man
. . .but we see Jesus," the scientific texts
emphasized only what can be seen through
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microscopes and telescopes, or rather, the
inference from such data, and often quite
fallacious inferences at that. Spiritual and
moral factors were lost in the search for
quantitative techniques. Modem science
came to espouse a false soteriology and
thus widened the gulf between the twen
tieth century and Biblical Christianity. The
divorce from the Hebrew-Christian revel
ation hastened the modern descent to rel
ativity in morals. The whole naturalistic
movement from the Renaissance to our
times has issued in a naturalistic ethics
which has been the undermining of all
ethics.
The challenge to the contemporary
scientist is that he declares, as unequivoc
ally as he proclaims the relevance of the
scientific method, the relevance of some
super-scientific method, and that he con
sider himself under a supreme obligation
to pursue super-scientific truth as devot
edly as he pursues restricted scientific
truth.* No accumulation of ethical seminars
by distinguished scientists touches the prob
lem, while the rupture with the sufficiency
of scientific method is half-hearted. Atomic
physics may refine sense perception,
teaching us that reality is uncritically man
ifested to sensation, but it is no wedge
at all for the admission of value areas
which cannot be manifested�even un
critically�in the stuff with which labor
atories deal; the reality of values turns
on the acknowledgment of a method com
petent to deal with them. The open-mind-
edness which cheerfully grants that the
scientific method cannot rule out the pos
sibility of God and eternal values, might
as significantly grant the possibility of
transparent ghost writers and two-headed
snarks on the other side of Mars. Open-
*If the objects of theological and philosophical
study are genuine, there is no compunction to
limit the term "scientific method" to sensation-
alistic inductionism. The widening of objective
reality involves the widening also of scientific
methodology. From this viewpoint, it is quite
unscientific arbitrarily to restrict the term to
a small segment of reality which, as a whole,
can be systematically explored. But the term is
used here in its recent limited sense, by way of
accommodation.
mindedness on such issues means nothing,
while there is no clear cut statement of
the right of another method to deal with
the spiritual and moral aspects of reality.
No plea merely for the priority of the
social sciences over the physical sciences
is adequate, for social psychology, econ
omics and sociology can be used for evil as
well as for good ends. What we need is
a method which deals with ends, with val
ues, with an ought. If there is no such
method, then scientific angosticism is the
last word. If there is, then to stop with
scientific agnosticism is a crime against
humanity, for the wortli of man turns upon
the validity of certain values quite apart
from subjective preference and opinion.
The scientific method, as the moderns
define it, is not a method to deal with
the ought; it is an abstracted device for
dealing with the is, and, indeed, for deal
ing only with the phenomenal is. Great tra
ditions in world thought prior to modem
sensationalism considered it a tragic mis
take to think only of a science of phe
nomenal realities. They spoke of the sci
ence of nature; they recognized the exis
tence of normative, no less than of descrip
tive sciences. No merely descriptive obser
vation of nature and man will ever carry
one beyond the is to the ought. Therefore
the scientist who pleads for a renewed in
terest in morality, but who remains in
bondage to scientism, will never get be
yond the affirmation that a certain course
of action is preferable because it is most
pleasant or because it appears to work.
He will never rise to the requirement of a
true morality, with its insistence that the
good must be done because it is object
ively good.
It is not insisted that the scientist must,
in the midst of every scientific investi
gation, raise the question of ultimate val
ues�as though he has no right to peer
through his telescope until he has exhaust
ed the ethical implications of the par
ticular experiment. An obstetrician charg
ed with delivery of an infant would hard
ly be forgiven for interrupting his duties
to write a volume on vicarious suffering.
But to convert this necessity for scientific
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diligence into a total indifference to values
is quite another thing.
Nor, because we insist upon ultimates
which are beyond change and flux, and
upon which the whole scientific endeavor
finally rests if it is to make sense, are we
to be charged with complete abandonment
of any realm of probability and revision.
That there is a realm of technics, which
is most competent to deal by direct ex
amination and research with certain areas
of reality, reaching conclusions which are
subject to constant empirical revision, is
not at all beyond dispute, as long as the
interpretations yielded by such a method
are clearly labeled as partial explanations,
abstracted for specific uses, and not deal
ing with the question of purpose, nor
minimizing that the why is in the long run
of greater significance than the what.
Science affords us a view of things
which is only partially coherent, and
which therefore reaches beyond itself for
intelligibility. This is true not only of the
conclusions of science, but also of the
very premises with which it sets out. As
to the conclusions, it is a frustrating and
self-defeating statement of human nature,
and one which can issue only in pessimism,
which fixes upon man as a speck of an
imated stellar dust and leaves suspended
in mid-air his deepest hopes and fears in
volving a relationship to a real but un
seen spiritual order; science does not make
room for the scientist, in his most intimate
personal experiences, on such an approach.
As to the initial assumptions, science can
not even get underway without a commit
ment to those basic moral obligations upon
which all knowledge depends, such as the
intrinsic superiority of honesty over dis
honesty, of objectivity over caprice in
expetimentation, as well as the broad as
sumptions of the intelligibility of the un
iverse and of the value of truth as against
superstition The whole scientific enter
prise is robbed of coherence if the shadow
of moral and rational relativity is cast
over these primary postulates.
What is clearly needed is a method
which retains meaning for all the valid
elements of human experience No appeal
simply to a philosophic method, nor to a
revelational method, is self-sufficient, for
philosophic methods are legion and com
peting revelation-claims must likewise be
tested. We must not abandon crucial areas
of human experience to unrelieved par
adox, but rather, rise to that coherence
which retains significance for every le
gitimate aspect of life and history. The
fact that some philosophers in the name
of coherence, have settled for idealistic
and sub-Christian interpretations of real
ity need not trouble the Christian, as long
as he can press the case that the coherence
of the facts of science, values, and of
God is more profound and complex than
the truncated coherence which is some
times preferred. Just as science, within the
arbitrarily fixed limits of its methodology,
cannot attain to more than a partial under
standing of its data, so too the attempt to
make room for an objective spiritual and
moral order does not attain a fully coher
ent expression apart from a proper cen-
trality for that special divine revelation
centering in the Hebrew-Christian scrip
tures and fulfilled in Jesus Christ. A view
of existence which asserts an abiding
truth and goodness makes room for its
own affirmations about scientific phe
nomena, but it is not so coherent as a view
which is alert to special divine revelation,
for that alone affords a compelling the
istic framework to underwrite the object
ivity of genuine religious and moral en
counter.
In the recovery of morality, scientists
today bear a heavy responsibility. As they
conveyed to the modem world the impres
sion that scientific discoveries have over
thrown Biblical supernaturalism, they must
now contend with equal vitality�if they
are in earnest about super-scientific
knowlede�for the relevance of that same
objective spiritual and moral order which
once they denied. That is not an easy task.
For one thing, scientism spurred the cul
tural descent to naturalism, but the scien
tist by themselves cannot spur a cultural
ascent to Christian conviction. Much more
in the way of personal spiritual encounter
and decision is involved in such an ex-
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change. The overthrow of relativistic ex
pediency in the interest of Biblical moral
ity is not a reversal to which humanity is
naturally inclined. Furthermore, the aban
donment of the optimistic notion of the
essential goodness of man may be made to
yield as much comfort to naturalism as to
Biblical theism. If man is no longer, at
the core of his being, to be viewed as a
minor deity, is the dominance of brute
impulses to be interpreted along the pat
tern of man's essential animality? That is
a crucial question today, and the whole
movement of recent science has not for
mulated any unambiguous case for man's
essential super-animality.
The case for an ojective morality can
not be separated today, any more that it
was in the early Christian ages, from the
issue of divine revelation. There is only
one effective alternative to the illusion
of man's animality, as also to the illusion
of his essential deity, and that is that man
is a sinner. He is not a miniature God,
but he is a creature made in the image of
the holy Lord of the universe. He is not
an animal, but he is a fallen sinner in
revolt against his Maker, and is morally
responsible for his defection. That is the
proclamation of revealed religion. In the
Hebrew-Christian scriptures alone is God
self-disclosed as the ultimate source of our
moral distinctions, and as so holy that he
does not gloss over the sinfulness of man.
He is so holy that he neither overlooks
sin, nor accepts the best offerings of
tarnished hands and hearts as the equiva
lent of the divine standard of holiness. He
declares instead that man cannot save him
self, so radical is the plight of fallen hu
manity, yet that God in sovereign mercy
promises and provides in Christ that alone
sufficient salvation.
That view of objective holiness alone
stands in sufficient judgment upon the
moral complacency of modern man, re
acting to sin with a high cosmic serious
ness. There alone is found the offer of a
redemptive dynamic sufficient to lift man
beyond egoistic and destructive impulses.
There alone is the message which, if made
the context for the modern scientific pur
suit, will enable scientism to redeem the
time which it has spent in undermining
the relevance of Christian supernaturalism
and the moral demand of reality upon
men's minds and hearts.
There is no effective plea for an objec
tive morality, except in terms of the divine
revelation spoken by God to man. It is be
cause God has spoken that we know our
selves at once as objects of His cre
ative and of His redemptive love. It is
as we acknowledge our sinfulness and our
need of His mercy that we come to ex
perience God as the supreme value of life,
and as the source of changeless moral
norms.
That may not be a message with which
modern science is primarily concerned,
but unless the modern scientist makes it
a primary concern, he cannot escape de
livering our age to barbarism and despair.
Indifference to essential Christianity
means indifference to values, and indif
ference to values will sooner or later clear
ly imply the valuelessness of science in
the most significant areas of human life.
